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THE RATIONALITY OF PERCEPTION, BY SUSANNA 
SIEGEL 
BILL BREWER 
 
 
Throughout its history the philosophy of perception has sought to understand 
the nature and role of normal perception by considering some of its deviations 
from the norm, in particular, and notoriously, cases of illusion and hallucination. 
Susanna Siegel’s rich and important book seeks to continue this tradition in 
connection with a novel but equally pervasive deviation in which how things 
look to a perceiver depends upon her prior outlook and attitudes in a way that 
apparently leaves her subject to some form of criticism. The basic phenomenon 
is surely familiar, important, and deserving of philosophical investigation. I am 
less convinced by Siegel’s particular framework for explaining the deviation and 
for understanding and illuminating the normal epistemic role of perception as a 
result. 
 
For simplicity I organize my discussion around one of Siegel’s paradigm 
examples, although an aspect of the book’s richness is her sensitivity to the 
variety of related phenomena and the potential for differences in their structure. 
Nevertheless, Siegel’s contention is that the core of their explanation is the same. 
 
Before seeing Jack, Jill fears that Jack is angry at her. When she sees him, her 
fear causes her to perceive Jack as angry [at the level of visual experience 
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rather than merely influencing her perceptual belief], and this perception 
strengthens her fear. (p. 6) 
 
Jill has no indication that her experience is misleading and simply believes that 
Jack is as her experiences represents him: angry. This suggests that she has the 
rational support that experience normally confers for her fear that Jack is angry. 
Yet she only has this support because she feared that Jack is angry in the first 
place; and so that fear has effectively acquired rational support from itself in a 
way that seems wrong. This is the problem of hijacked experience (p. 6): how can 
we explain Jill’s epistemic failing without undermining the rational role of 
perceptual experience? 
 
Siegel’s solution to the problem of hijacked experience is that it is not rational for 
Jill to believe that Jack is angry on the basis of her experience that he is angry 
because that experience itself is irrational in being the result of an epistemically 
inappropriate inference: one that relies upon an epistemically inappropriate 
prior attitude as a premise, is circular, or involves jumping to unwarranted 
conclusions. Elaborating this particular case, she appeals to the last of these 
epistemic vices, but she gives examples of the others too. She considers various 
arguments against the idea that experiences might be rationally evaluable from 
premises to the effect that they are passive or unadjustable in the light of 
competing reasons; and she rejects these on the grounds that certain varieties of 
passivity and unadjustability apply equally to beliefs and that in other senses 
experiences are in fact adjustable. 
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Siegel’s general contention is that experiences are rationally evaluable in virtue 
of belonging, like beliefs, to the subject’s outlook: the way the world seems to her 
to be. Call this the Outlook Thesis, (OT). One way in which they enter her outlook 
is on the basis of inference and they are then rationally evaluable in the light of 
the epistemic merits of the relevant inference. Alongside this line of thought, 
Siegel also offers the Phenomenal Ground Argument, (PGA), as a basis for the 
idea that experiences have epistemic power to justify beliefs with appropriately 
related contents: this is due to their having presentational phenomenal 
character. On the basis of their subsequent development, I understand this 
combination of ideas as follows. Presentational phenonmenal character endows 
experience with a baseline epistemic power to justify relevant beliefs. In the 
presence of an inferential basis for experience, this baseline may be downgraded 
or uplifted by the credentials of the supporting inference, yielding the final 
epistemic standing and powers of the experience. 
 
In the case of Jill’s experience of Jack, the idea is this. Jill has an experience 
representing Jack as angry that has prima facie epistemic power to support her 
belief that he is angry; but this apparent power is in fact downgraded because 
her experience is derived by epistemically inappropriate inference on the basis 
of her prior fear that he is angry. More precisely, her diagnosis of the error is that 
Jill’s fear leads her to jump from a sub-experience representing Jack has having a 
blank stare to an unwarranted sub-experiential conclusion representing that he 
is angry; this in turn appears (in virtue of its presentational phenomenology), 
but fails (in virtue of its inappropriate inferential basis), to support her belief 
that Jack is angry. 
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One question to ask about the general approach here is whether inference 
leading to an experiential conclusion always rests in this way on a more basic 
(sub-)experiential premise truly at epistemic baseline, or whether there may be 
inferential experiences without any sub-experiential premises. I can see lines of 
objection to either option. The former gives a certain priority to (PGA) and the 
latter favours (OT). The objections I see suggest a tension between (PGA) and 
(OT). 
 
Suppose, to take the latter option first, that there may be inferential experiences 
without any sub-experiential premises. Assume further that for any visual 
experience, a situation can be constructed in which a phenomenally 
indistinguishable experience is produced by epistemically inappropriate 
inference with no sub-experiential premises. The latter is downgraded as a result 
and has no power to support any beliefs with relevant contents; yet, in the 
context of Siegel’s non-disjunctive Content View, it has the same presentational 
phenomenal character as the experience that we began with. So how can that 
phenomenal character be a source of positive epistemic charge? It is difficult to 
see how presentational phenomenal character alone confers baseline epistemic 
power at all. In this framework, then, the intuitive force of (PGA) depends upon 
the idea that experiences have at least some sub-experiences not subject to the 
perceiver’s inferential influence. These sub-experiences may be illusory, of 
course; but they at least have the baseline epistemic powers conferred by their 
presentational phenomenal character. 
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This motivates the former option in answer to my question above. Inference 
leading to an experiential conclusion always rests on a more basic sub-
experiential premise truly at epistemic baseline. As we saw, this is also the model 
that Siegel explicitly proposes in Jill’s case. Her epistemic error is to jump from 
the sub-experiential premise that Jack has a blank stare to the unwarranted 
experiential conclusion that he is angry as a result of her prior fear that he is 
angry. The concern here is that, given the range of phenomena that Siegel wishes 
to bring under the banner of inferentially derived experiences, the range of 
experiential contents reliably coming in at epistemic baseline may be vanishingly 
narrow. 
 
Consider the banana case. To those familiar with ripe (yellow) bananas, a greyish 
banana may look yellow. I assume further that the effect depends on the actual 
colour of the banana: a bright purple banana would not look yellow, for example. 
So the inference must proceed not only from a sub-experiential premise that the 
object is a banana, but also from one concerning its grey colour. This cannot be 
that the banana is grey, since this would presumably block inference to any 
conclusion that it is yellow. So the relevant sub-experiential premise must be 
that the object looks greyish. This suggests the following inference between 
experiential contents. E1: that looks greyish; E2: that is a banana; so E3: that is 
actually yellow (in bad light). Note that the experimental finding that the banana 
looks yellow is explained by the conclusion experience representing it as yellow; 
but in order to achieve this result the inference must begin with a sub-
experiential premise representing the banana as looking greyish. I assume that 
analogous phenomena may be generated with respect to many of the basic 
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visible features of familiar everyday objects. So there is a danger that this option 
commits Siegel to the view that the only sub-experiences genuinely at epistemic 
baseline simply in virtue of their presentational phenomenal character are those 
with contents concerning, not the way such things actually are, but merely the 
ways they look. The epistemic standing of more objectively committal contents 
presumably depends on the absence or elimination of the interfering effects of 
inappropriate experiential inference. 
 
There are clearly responses available to proponents of both options in answer to 
my initial question whether inference leading to an experiential conclusion 
always rests in this way on a more basic (sub-)experiential premise truly at 
epistemic baseline, or whether there may be inferential experiences without any 
sub-experiential premises. But these difficulties move me in another direction to 
accommodate Siegel’s phenomena. 
 
According to the Outlook Thesis, any mental state contributing to the way the 
world seems, in the widest sense, to be to the subject is epistemically evaluable. 
This applies as much to the way things look to be around her as to the way she 
believes things are more generally. Siegel is also right in my opinion that any 
such way things seem may be the result of appropriate or inappropriate 
attentional, inferential and other effects that might be collected under the head 
of the subject’s epistemic character and orientation. So none have their epistemic 
standing solely in virtue of their phenomenology. If the conscious character of 
perception is to make a distinctive contribution to the full account of our 
empirical knowledge, this must be elsewhere. I suggest that presentational 
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phenomenal character is indeed crucial; but what it contributes is the domain 
itself of the particular worldly objects and their features – colours, shapes, sizes, 
textures, orientations, and so on – that we are consciously acquainted with in 
perception. Our outlook is then a matter of what we make of these things on the 
basis of our epistemic character and orientation. 
 
In any non-hallucinatory case, we stand in a simple relation of conscious 
acquaintance, from a certain point of view and in specific circumstances, with 
various objects and their features in the world around us. This makes possible 
our thought about those very things and is ultimately essential to it. And this is 
the fundamental epistemic contribution of phenomenal consciousness in 
perception: not a privileged content with (defeasible) baseline epistemic 
standing as proposed by (PGA), but rather a more basic form of access to the 
world that provides the subject matter of knowledge and belief. What we 
actually make of the world presented in perception – the ways those things look 
to be – is a function of many further factors: attention (both endogenous and 
exogenous), interest, purpose, expectation, bias, prior assumption, emotion, 
other attitudes, and so on. The result is part of our outlook, subject to epistemic 
evaluation, and may be found wanting in virtue of any number of inappropriate 
influences of such factors. We may then be epistemically criticizable to the extent 
that the relevant factors are within our control. In other cases, though, the result 
may simply be a matter of our seeing, and hence knowing, that o is F. 
 
There is certainly an epistemically evaluable transition here, from conscious 
acquaintance with a portion of reality to a view about the way things are in the 
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world; and the result may either be a piece of perceptual knowledge or fail to be 
so due to the inappropriate influence of factors of the kinds that Siegel rightly 
identifies. Characterizing this as an inference from premise contents to 
conclusion content invites a series of problems and objections, though, that may 
be avoided by this alternative account of the phenomena. 
 
I absolutely agree with Siegel that reflection on these phenomena, and in 
particular her puzzle of hijacked experience, illuminates the nature of perceptual 
experience and perceptual knowledge; but I remain unconvinced by her attempt 
to provide this illumination within a framework of inference to experiential 
contents. 
